Abstracts for Falsity II -- Negation, Fiction and Rejection
María José Frápolli (UCL/Granda): Incompatibility and Negation. An Inferentialist Narrative
Proof-theoretic semantics [PTS] defines the meaning of logical constants as sets of introduction and elimination rules. I-rules insert logical terms into an inference and E-rules permit get rid of them. This is a very natural way of thinking of logical constants, as their meaning is arguably better represented as rules than as substantive concepts. Gentzen’s natural deduction calculus (1934) and Dummett’s pragmatism (1993) are, respectively, the logical and philosophical mentors of [PTS]. But if the general [PTS] framework is easy to endorse, its implementation presents difficulties that threaten its theoretical terseness. One of these difficulties relates to negation. Kurbis (2015) evaluates and dismisses some alternative treatments of negation in terms of incompatibility for being “unconvincing”. My aim in this paper will be offer further reasons for incompatibility over negation as the basic semantic and logical notion
Andreas Kaspner (Munich): Logic, Fiction, Falsity
In this paper, I would like to investigate in how far we can use stories to learn about logic. How can we engage with fiction in order to come to find out what logical principles are actually valid? Is that possible at all? I claim that it is, and I propose two case studies that focus on non-classical accounts of negation, namely the constructive and the paraconsistent account. From these considerations, we'll be able to draw some conclusions about what has to be, what could not be and what might be false in a story.
Mark Textor (KCL): Acknowledgement, Rejection and Existence
Brentano tried to forge a connection between the non-propositional acts of acknowledgment (Anerkennen) and rejection (Verwerfen) and the notion of existence. In my talk I will argue that Brentano's account provides the basis of view of existence that contrasts in interesting ways with the influential Frege-Russell view.
María José Frápolli (UCL/Granda): Incompatibility and Negation. An Inferentialist Narrative
Proof-theoretic semantics [PTS] defines the meaning of logical constants as sets of introduction and elimination rules. I-rules insert logical terms into an inference and E-rules permit get rid of them. This is a very natural way of thinking of logical constants, as their meaning is arguably better represented as rules than as substantive concepts. Gentzen’s natural deduction calculus (1934) and Dummett’s pragmatism (1993) are, respectively, the logical and philosophical mentors of [PTS]. But if the general [PTS] framework is easy to endorse, its implementation presents difficulties that threaten its theoretical terseness. One of these difficulties relates to negation. Kurbis (2015) evaluates and dismisses some alternative treatments of negation in terms of incompatibility for being “unconvincing”. My aim in this paper will be offer further reasons for incompatibility over negation as the basic semantic and logical notion
Andreas Kaspner (Munich): Logic, Fiction, Falsity
In this paper, I would like to investigate in how far we can use stories to learn about logic. How can we engage with fiction in order to come to find out what logical principles are actually valid? Is that possible at all? I claim that it is, and I propose two case studies that focus on non-classical accounts of negation, namely the constructive and the paraconsistent account. From these considerations, we'll be able to draw some conclusions about what has to be, what could not be and what might be false in a story.
Mark Textor (KCL): Acknowledgement, Rejection and Existence
Brentano tried to forge a connection between the non-propositional acts of acknowledgment (Anerkennen) and rejection (Verwerfen) and the notion of existence. In my talk I will argue that Brentano's account provides the basis of view of existence that contrasts in interesting ways with the influential Frege-Russell view.