Ancient and Modern Topics in Epistemology
During the first five weeks of this course, we’ll focus on Plato’s epistemology. The focus is on the Theaetetus, but we’ll also look at Plato’s general outlook and the Meno. The Theaetetus is a masterpiece and one of the greatest texts in philosophy, so we’ll read it in its entirety. Each week, there’s a section from the Theaetetus to be read for the lectures. In the seminars, we’ll discuss secondary literature. You’ll find various translations in print and online. I recommend the following commentary and translation: Myles Burnyeat: The Theaetetus of Plato, with a translation of Plato’s Theaetetus by MJ Levett (Indianapolis: Hackett 1990). Every edition of a work by Plato has the same pagination either in the margins or in the text (in the case of the Theaetetus between 141a and 210d), so the page numbers below will allow you to find the passages in any edition of the Theaetetus. During the second half of the course, we will look at how various ideas we found in the Theaetetus have been taken up in contemporary epistemology. You’ll find essay questions and suggestions for further reading at the end of this page.
Week 1. Plato, Meno and Theaetetus
Lecture: Theautetus 142a-151d
Seminar: G Fine: Inquiry in the Meno, in Richard Kraut (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992): 200-26
Listen to MM McCabe on Philosophy Bites on the Paradox of Inquiry and on Socratic Method. There are also many podcasts on Plato on Peter Adamson’s History of Philosophy without any Gaps.
Week 2. Knowledge is Perception. Part I
Lecture: Theaetetus 151d-169e
Seminar: MF Burnyeat: Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato’s Theaetetus, Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 172-195
Week 3. Knowledge is Perception. Part II
Lecture: Theaetetus 170a-186e
Seminar: JM Cooper: Plato on Sense-Perception and Knowledge (Theaetetus 184-6), Phronesis 15 (1970): 123-65
Week 4. Knowledge is True Belief
Lecture: Theaetetus 187a-201c
Seminar: J Barnes and MF Burnyeat: Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato’s Distinction between Knowledge and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society 54 (1980): 173-206
Week 5. Knowledge is True Belief with an Account
Lecture: Theaetetus 201c-210d
Seminar: D Frede: The Soul’s Silent Dialogue: a Non-Aporetic Reading of the Theaetetus, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 215 (1989): 20-49
Week 6. Gettier Cases
Lecture: E Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123
Seminar: L Zagzebski: The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 65-73
Week 7. Scepticism Ancient and Modern
Lecture: G Fine: Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII, in S Everson (ed.): Epistemology. Companions to Ancient Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990): 85-116
Seminar: C Wright: (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: GE Moore and John McDowell, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 330-348
Week 8. Minimalist Epistemology (with Jake Wojtowicz)
Lecture: C Sartwell: Knowledge is merely True Belief, American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 157-165
Seminar: C Sartwell: Why Knowledge is merely True Belief, Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992): 167-180
Week 9: Knowledge How and Knowledge That (with Andrew Huddleston)
Lecture: T Williamson and J Stanley: Knowing How, Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-444
Seminar: A Noe: Against Intellectualism, Analysis 65 (2005): 278-290
Week 10: Knowledge of Mathematics
Lecture: P Benacerraf: Mathematical Truth, Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 661-679
Seminar: B Hale and C Wright: Benacerraf’s Dilemma Revisited, European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002): 101-129
Essay Questions
1. Explain the paradox of inquiry. How can we solve it?
2. Socrates argues that Protragoras’ relativism is self-refuting. But is it?
3. The view that knowledge is perception gets thoroughly refuted in the Theaetetus. Can I nonetheless get knowledge through perception?
4. Is knowledge true belief? Or true belief with a third element, such as justification or an account? Or with further elements, such as being undefeated or causal relations? Can knowledge be defined at all? In your essay, it suffices to consider one of those options.
5. Is knowledge hard to get by? Or very easy for at least some kinds of knowledge, as GE Moore thought?
6. ‘All knowledge-how is really just knowledge of propositions that describe how to do things. So knowledge-how is just knowledge-that in disguise.’ Discuss.
7. How is knowledge of mathematics possible?
Further Reading
Barnes, J: ‘Some Ways of Scepticism’, in S Everson (ed.): Epistemology. Companions to Ancient Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990): 204-225
Blome-Tillmann, M: ‘The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge’, Analysis 67 (2007): 214-219
Burnyeat, MF: ‘Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy’, Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 44-69
Burnyeat, MF: ‘Examples in Epistemology: Socrates, Theaetetus and G.E.Moore’, Philosophy 52 (1977): 381-96
Burnyeat, MF: ‘Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed’, Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 3-40
Conee, E and Feldman, R: ‘Internalism Defended’, American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 1-18
Goldman, A: ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967): 357-372
Goldman, A: ‘Internalism Exposed’, Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 271-293
Kearns, S: ‘In Praise of a Folly: A Reply to Blome-Tillman’, Analysis 67 (2007): 219-222
Lehrer, K and Paxson, T: ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 225-237
Maddy, P: ‘Perception and Mathematical Intuition’, Philosophical Review 89 (1980): 163-196
Nehamas, A.: ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985): 1-30
Pryor, J: ‘The Sceptic and the Dogmatist’, Nous 34 (2000): 517-549
Sedley, DN: ‘Three Platonist Interpretations of the Theaetetus’, in C Gill, MM McCabe (eds.): Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996): 79-103
Williamson, T: Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000): chapters 1 & 2
During the first five weeks of this course, we’ll focus on Plato’s epistemology. The focus is on the Theaetetus, but we’ll also look at Plato’s general outlook and the Meno. The Theaetetus is a masterpiece and one of the greatest texts in philosophy, so we’ll read it in its entirety. Each week, there’s a section from the Theaetetus to be read for the lectures. In the seminars, we’ll discuss secondary literature. You’ll find various translations in print and online. I recommend the following commentary and translation: Myles Burnyeat: The Theaetetus of Plato, with a translation of Plato’s Theaetetus by MJ Levett (Indianapolis: Hackett 1990). Every edition of a work by Plato has the same pagination either in the margins or in the text (in the case of the Theaetetus between 141a and 210d), so the page numbers below will allow you to find the passages in any edition of the Theaetetus. During the second half of the course, we will look at how various ideas we found in the Theaetetus have been taken up in contemporary epistemology. You’ll find essay questions and suggestions for further reading at the end of this page.
Week 1. Plato, Meno and Theaetetus
Lecture: Theautetus 142a-151d
Seminar: G Fine: Inquiry in the Meno, in Richard Kraut (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992): 200-26
Listen to MM McCabe on Philosophy Bites on the Paradox of Inquiry and on Socratic Method. There are also many podcasts on Plato on Peter Adamson’s History of Philosophy without any Gaps.
Week 2. Knowledge is Perception. Part I
Lecture: Theaetetus 151d-169e
Seminar: MF Burnyeat: Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato’s Theaetetus, Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 172-195
Week 3. Knowledge is Perception. Part II
Lecture: Theaetetus 170a-186e
Seminar: JM Cooper: Plato on Sense-Perception and Knowledge (Theaetetus 184-6), Phronesis 15 (1970): 123-65
Week 4. Knowledge is True Belief
Lecture: Theaetetus 187a-201c
Seminar: J Barnes and MF Burnyeat: Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato’s Distinction between Knowledge and Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society 54 (1980): 173-206
Week 5. Knowledge is True Belief with an Account
Lecture: Theaetetus 201c-210d
Seminar: D Frede: The Soul’s Silent Dialogue: a Non-Aporetic Reading of the Theaetetus, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 215 (1989): 20-49
Week 6. Gettier Cases
Lecture: E Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123
Seminar: L Zagzebski: The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 65-73
Week 7. Scepticism Ancient and Modern
Lecture: G Fine: Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII, in S Everson (ed.): Epistemology. Companions to Ancient Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990): 85-116
Seminar: C Wright: (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: GE Moore and John McDowell, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 330-348
Week 8. Minimalist Epistemology (with Jake Wojtowicz)
Lecture: C Sartwell: Knowledge is merely True Belief, American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 157-165
Seminar: C Sartwell: Why Knowledge is merely True Belief, Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992): 167-180
Week 9: Knowledge How and Knowledge That (with Andrew Huddleston)
Lecture: T Williamson and J Stanley: Knowing How, Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-444
Seminar: A Noe: Against Intellectualism, Analysis 65 (2005): 278-290
Week 10: Knowledge of Mathematics
Lecture: P Benacerraf: Mathematical Truth, Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 661-679
Seminar: B Hale and C Wright: Benacerraf’s Dilemma Revisited, European Journal of Philosophy 10 (2002): 101-129
Essay Questions
1. Explain the paradox of inquiry. How can we solve it?
2. Socrates argues that Protragoras’ relativism is self-refuting. But is it?
3. The view that knowledge is perception gets thoroughly refuted in the Theaetetus. Can I nonetheless get knowledge through perception?
4. Is knowledge true belief? Or true belief with a third element, such as justification or an account? Or with further elements, such as being undefeated or causal relations? Can knowledge be defined at all? In your essay, it suffices to consider one of those options.
5. Is knowledge hard to get by? Or very easy for at least some kinds of knowledge, as GE Moore thought?
6. ‘All knowledge-how is really just knowledge of propositions that describe how to do things. So knowledge-how is just knowledge-that in disguise.’ Discuss.
7. How is knowledge of mathematics possible?
Further Reading
Barnes, J: ‘Some Ways of Scepticism’, in S Everson (ed.): Epistemology. Companions to Ancient Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990): 204-225
Blome-Tillmann, M: ‘The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge’, Analysis 67 (2007): 214-219
Burnyeat, MF: ‘Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy’, Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 44-69
Burnyeat, MF: ‘Examples in Epistemology: Socrates, Theaetetus and G.E.Moore’, Philosophy 52 (1977): 381-96
Burnyeat, MF: ‘Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed’, Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 3-40
Conee, E and Feldman, R: ‘Internalism Defended’, American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 1-18
Goldman, A: ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967): 357-372
Goldman, A: ‘Internalism Exposed’, Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 271-293
Kearns, S: ‘In Praise of a Folly: A Reply to Blome-Tillman’, Analysis 67 (2007): 219-222
Lehrer, K and Paxson, T: ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 225-237
Maddy, P: ‘Perception and Mathematical Intuition’, Philosophical Review 89 (1980): 163-196
Nehamas, A.: ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985): 1-30
Pryor, J: ‘The Sceptic and the Dogmatist’, Nous 34 (2000): 517-549
Sedley, DN: ‘Three Platonist Interpretations of the Theaetetus’, in C Gill, MM McCabe (eds.): Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996): 79-103
Williamson, T: Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000): chapters 1 & 2